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Abstract—It is well known that users on open blockchains are
tracked by an industry providing services to governments, law
enforcement, secret services, and alike. While most blockchains
do not protect their users’ privacy and allow external observers
to link transactions and addresses, a growing research interest
attempts to design add-on privacy solutions to help users regain
their privacy on non-private blockchains.
In this work, we propose to our knowledge the first censorship
resilient mixer, which can reward its users in a privacy-preserving
manner for participating in the system. Increasing the anonymity
set size, and diversity of users, is, as we believe, an important
endeavor to raise a mixer’s contributed privacy in practice. The
paid out rewards can take the form of governance token to
decentralize the voting on system parameters, similar to how
popular “DeFi farming” protocols operate.
Our system AMR is autonomous as it does not rely on any
external server or third party. The evaluation of our AMR im-
plementation shows that the system supports today on Ethereum
anonymity set sizes beyond thousands of users, and a capacity
of over 66, 000 deposits per day, at constant system costs. We
provide a formal specification of our zk-SNARK-based AMR
system, a privacy and security analysis, implementation, and
evaluation with both the MiMC and Poseidon hash functions. We
invite the interested reader to try our approach on the Ethereum
Kovan testnet under https://amrmixer.keybase.pub.
I. INTRODUCTION
More than a decade after the emergence of permissionless
blockchains, such as Bitcoin, related work has thoroughly
shown that the blockchain’s pseudonymity is not offering
its clients strong anonymity. Several works have therefore
attempted to both, deanonymize clients, cluster addresses [9],
[25] as well as to build privacy solutions to protect the clients’
privacy [38], [44], [29]. Those existing privacy solutions can
be categorized in two classes: (i) a fundamental blockchain
redesign to natively offer better privacy to clients, and (ii)
add-on privacy solutions that aim to offer privacy for clients
of existing, non-privacy-preserving blockchains.
This paper focuses on add-on privacy solutions, that mix
cryptocurrency coins within an anonymity set. One known
problem of such mixers, is that their provided privacy depends
on the anonymity set size, i.e. on the number of active clients
of the protocol. A particular focus of this work is hence to
find a new way to incentivise clients to participate in the
mixer. Similar to popular “DeFi farming” protocols [2], our
system, called AMR, chooses to reward mixer participants by
granting governance tokens when a client deposits coins for
at least time t within the mixer. Naturally, the reward payout
must remain privacy preserving, i.e. a reward payment must
be unlinkable to a deposit from the same client of the mixer.
Clients can utilize the collected tokens to govern AMR in a
decentralized manner, without the need for an external server,
or centralized entity. We hope that such mixer attracts clients
that are privacy-sensitive and/or interested in a token reward,
to ultimately maximize the anonymity set and client diversity
within AMR.
We formalize the zk-SNARK-based AMR system, and
implement the mixer in 1, 013 lines of Solidity code. A
deposit costs 1.2m gas (31.95 USD), while a withdrawal costs
0.37m gas (9.12 USD), receiving a reward amounts to 0.32m
gas (8.36 USD) 1 2. These numbers support a real-world
deployment, that could support over 66, 000 deposits per day
given Ethereum’s transaction throughput (assuming no with-
drawals). The resulting anonymity set sizes, which can easily
exceed 1, 000 while operating at constant system costs, offer
stronger privacy than, e.g. the ring signature based privacy
solution [35], which costs scale linearly with the size of the
anonymity set and are hence practically capped at anonymity
set sizes of 24 (8m gas (213 USD) for withdrawing).
Our contributions can be summarized as follows.
• We present the formalization of a practical zk-SNARK
based mixer AMR, which breaks the linkability between
deposited and withdrawn coins of a client on a smart
contract enabled blockchain. We include a security and
privacy analysis, as well as a novel combining notes
approach to improve the offered privacy.
• To decentralize AMR’s governance and incentivise clients
to join the system, we invent a privacy preserving reward
scheme for its clients. We believe that in practice, an
incentive scheme would attract more and a wider variety
of clients to such privacy solution, and hence contribute
to a better anonymity for all involved clients.
• We implement AMR and show that the system can be
deployed and operated efficiently on a permissionless
blockchain. A deposit into the system costs 1.2m (31.95
USD), a withdrawal costs 0.37m gas (9.12 USD) and
collecting a reward costs 0.32m gas (8.36 USD) in
transaction fees on the current Ethereum network. The
anonymity set size of AMR could grow to up to 2d,
while operating at constant system costs once deployed
(we applied a Merkle height tree of 30 within this
1Estimated using Ethererum price of $380.4 in 08/25/2020 14:39 UTC.
2Using the gas price of 70 Gwei. 1 GWei is 1× 10−9 Ether.
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evaluation). Generating client-side withdrawal and reward
proofs costs 6.657 and 3.607 seconds respectively on
commodity hardware.
Paper Organization. Section II outlines the necessary back-
ground before explaining an overview of AMR in Section III,
together with the desired security goals and threat model.
Section IV formally outlines the algorithms of AMR. Sec-
tion V provides a detailed description of AMR. Section VI
discusses how AMR achieves the security goals. Section VII
presents an implementation and evaluation of AMR in Solidity.
Section IX summarizes related works and Section X concludes
this paper. Section VIII outlines different applications of AMR
and discusses possible future works.
II. PRELIMINARIES
In this section, we define several building blocks for AMR.
A. Background on Smart Contract Blockchains
The Ethereum blockchain acts as a distributed virtual
machine that supports quasi Turing-complete programs. The
capability of executing highly expresssive languages in those
blockchains enables developers to create smart contract. The
blockchain also keeps track of the state of every account [47],
namely externally-owned accounts (EoA) controlled by private
key, and contract account own by contract’s code. Transac-
tions from EoA determine the state transitions of the virtual
machine. Transactions are either used to transfer Ether or
to trigger the execution of smart contract code. The cost of
execution functions are expressed in terms of gas unit. In
Ethereum, the sender of a transaction is the party that pays for
the cost of executing all contract operations triggered by that
transaction. For a more thorough background on blockchains
we refer the interested reader to [15], [10].
B. Cryptographic Primitives
Notation. We denote by 1λ the security parameter and by
negl(λ) a negligible function in λ. We express by (pk, sk)
a pair of public and secret keys. Moreover, we require that
pk can always be efficiently derived from sk, and we denote
EXTRACTPK(sk) = pk to be the deterministic function to
derive pk from sk. k||r denotes concatenation of two binary
string k and r. We denote Z≥a to denote the set of integers
that are greater or equal a, {a, a+ 1, . . . }. We let PPT denote
probabilistic polynomial time.
Collision resistant hash function. a family H of hash func-
tions is collision resistant, iff for all PPT A given h $←− H ,
the probability that A finds x, x′, such that h(x) = h(x′)
is negligible. we refer to the cryptographic hash function h
as a fixed function h : {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}λ. For the formal
definitions of cryptographic hash function family, we refer
reader to [40].
zk-SNARK. A zero-knowledge Succint Non-interactive AR-
gument of Knowledge (zk-SNARK) can be considered as
“succinct” NIZK for arithmetic circuit satisfiability. For a
field F, an arithmetic circuit C takes as inputs elements in
F and outputs elements in F. We use the similar definition
from Sasson et al.’s Zerocash paper [44] to define arithmetic
circuit satisfiability problem. An arithmetic circuit satisfiability
problem of a circuit C : Fn × Fh → Fl is capture by relation
RC = {(st,wit) ∈ Fn × Fh : C(st,wit) = 0l}; the language
is LC = {st ∈ Fn | ∃ wit ∈ Fl s.t C(st,wit) = 0l}.
Definition 1: zk-SNARK for arithmetic circuit satisfiability
is triple of efficient algorithms (SETUP, PROVE,VERIFY):
• (ek, vk) ← SETUP(1λ, C) takes as input the security
parameter and the arithmetic circuit C, outputs a common
reference string that contains the evaluation key ek later
used by prover to generate proof, and the verification
key vk later used by the verifier to verify the proof. The
public parameters, pp, is given implicitly to both proving
and verifying algorithms.
• pi ← PROVE(ek, st,wit) takes as input the evaluation key
ek and (st,wit) ∈ RC , outputs a proof pi that (st,wit) ∈
RC
• 0/1 ← VERIFY(vk, pi, st) takes as input the verification
key, the proof pi, the statement st, outputs 1 if pi is valid
proof for st ∈ LC .
In additional to correctness, soundness, and zero-knowledge
properties, a zk-SNARK requires two additional properties
Succinctness and Simulation extractability. Again, we defer
the definitions of these properties to [27]. We use st[a, b, c . . . ]
to denote an instance of the statement where a, b, c . . . have
fixed and public values. We use a shaded area i, j, k to denote
the private inputs in the statement st[a, b, c; i, j, k].
Commitment Scheme. A commitment scheme allows a client
to commit to chosen values while keeping those values hidden
from others during the committing round, and later during
the revealing round, client can decide to reveal the committed
value.
Definition 2: A commitment scheme com = (Pcom,Vcom)
consists of:
• c← Pcom(m, r) takes as input a message m and random-
ness r, outputs the commitment value c.
• 0/1 ← Vcom(c,m, r) commitment c, takes as input a
message m, and the decommitment value r, and return 1
iff c = Pcom(m, r). Otherwise, return 0.
We use commitment schemes that achieve two properties:
binding means that given commitment c, it is difficult to find a
different pair of message and randomness whose commitment
is c, and hiding means that given commitment c, it is hard to
learn anything about the committed message m from c.
Authenticated Data Structure (ADS). An authenticated data
structure can be used to compute a short digest of a set X =
{x1, . . . , xn}, so that later one can prove certain properties
of X with respect to the digest. In this work, we are only
interested in a data structure for set membership:
Definition 3: An authenticated data structure for set mem-
bership Π = (INIT, PROVE, VERIFY, UPDATE) is a tuple of
four efficient algorithms:
2
...
Carol ( )
53
 blocks elapsed
1
Alice ( ) Dave ( )Carol ( )Bob ( )
...
Alice ( )
2 4 6
Fig. 1: System Overview. In step 1 , clients deposit coins to the AMR contract. In 3 , a client with a previous deposit can
withdraw the coin from the AMR contract using a different address. In 5 , a client proves to the contract to own a deposit
older than t blocks to obtain a reward. The AMR contract updates its state and issues funds to clients in steps 2 , 4 and 6 .
• y ← INIT(1λ, X) the initialization algorithm takes as in-
put the security parameter and the set X = {x1, . . . , xn}
where xi ∈ {0, 1}∗, output y ∈ {0, 1}λ
• pi ← PROVE(i, x,X) takes as input an element x ∈
{0, 1}∗, 1 ≤ i ≤ n, and set X , outputs a proof that
x = xi ∈ X
• 0/1 ← VERIFY(i, x, y, pi) takes as input 1 ≤ i ≤ n, x ∈
{0, 1}∗, y ∈ {0, 1}λ, and proof pi, output 1 iff x = xi ∈
X and y = INIT(1λ, X). Otherwise, return 0.
• y′ ← UPDATE(i, x,X) takes as input 1 ≤ i ≤ n, x ∈
{0, 1}∗ and set X , output y′ = INIT(1λ, X ′) where X ′
is obtained by replace xi ∈ X with x.
We require the ADS to be correct and secure. We defer the
formal definitions of these properties to Boneh and Shoup’s
book [14]. Typical examples of authenticated data structures
are Merkle tree [36] or Accumulators [32], [13].
III. SYSTEM OVERVIEW
We proceed to define the system components, overview,
goals and the threat model.
A. System Components
There are three components of this system: the client, the
peer-to-peer (P2P) network, and the AMR smart contract.
• A Client interacts with the AMR smart contract through
externally owned accounts. A client can either deposit
coins, withdraw coins, or redeem a reward.
• The P2P Network is a set of nodes that exchange
blockchain data. Clients broadcast transactions to these
nodes, which eventually reach the mining nodes (min-
ers). Miners decide what transactions are written to the
blockchain through a consensus algorithms (i.e. Proof-of-
Work or Proof-of-Stake, etc.).
• The AMR Contract is the blockchain smart contract
that holds deposits, and handles withdrawals and reward
redemptions. The contract keeps track of different data
structures and parameters to verify the correctness and
the integrity of transactions sent to the contract.
B. System Overview
Figure 1 outlines the overview of interactions in AMR.
Contract Setup. During the contract setup phase, the AMR
contract is initialized with parameters and data structures
which are later used for verifying the correctness of future
depositing, withdrawing, and reward-redeeming transactions.
The contract is deployed to the blockchain during this phase.
Deposits. In AMR, clients deposit a fixed amount of coins into
the system. To deposit coins, client form a depositing transac-
tion, then send this transaction through the P2P Network 1 .
Once the transaction is validated, miners record the transaction
in a blockchain block. Each deposit transaction decreases the
balance of the clients’ address by a fixed amount of coins and
increases the balance of the contract by the same amount of
coins. This state transition is captured in 2 .
Withdrawals. To withdraw coins, the client forms a with-
drawing transaction, then sends this transaction through the
P2P Network 3 . The withdrawing transaction includes a
cryptographic proof certifying that the client has issued a
depositing transaction in the past without revealing precisely
which one the depositing transaction is. Miners validate the
correctness of the withdrawing transaction using the state
of the AMR contract. Once the withdrawing transaction is
verified, the transaction gets recorded to the blockchain, and
the network updates the state of the AMR contract 4 .
Reward Redemptions. AMR allows clients to earn a reward
based on certain conditions. In Figure 1, the condition for
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a client to redeem a reward is to keep the deposit inside
the contract pool for t blocks. Similarly, to obtain a reward,
a client forms a redeeming transaction and forwards the
transaction to the P2P Network 5 . The redeeming transaction
includes a cryptographic proof certifying that the client has
deposited coins at least t blocks in the past and that the coins
still remain in the AMR contract. Finally, miners validate the
redeeming transaction using the current state of the AMR con-
tract. Once the redeem transaction is validated, the transaction
gets recorded to a blockchain block, and the network updates
the state of the AMR contract 6 .
C. System Goals
In the following, we outline our system goals.
Correctness. Generally, AMR needs to ensure that clients
should not be able to steal coins from the AMR contract
or from other clients. Moreover, we design AMR such that
clients can redeem a reward after they have deposited their
coins into the AMR contract for certain period of time, as a
reward system will incentivise clients to deposit more into the
system while contributing to the size of the anonymity set.
AMR needs to provide the following guarantees: (i) It is
infeasible for clients to issue n withdrawal transactions without
issuing at least n deposit transactions into the AMR contract
beforehand. (ii) It is infeasible for a client to issue a redeeming
transaction without having any coins locked in the AMR
contract. (iii) A valid redeeming transaction indicates that a
client always has at least one deposit locked in the AMR
contract for a span of time t, a system parameter.
Privacy. In addition to correctness, AMR needs to ensure the
privacy to clients of the system. In particular, considering an
adversary that has access to the history of all depositing, with-
drawing, and redeeming transactions sent to AMR contract, the
system needs to ensure (i) the unlinkability between deposit
and withdrawing transactions (ii) the unlinkability between
deposit and redeeming transactions, and (iii) the unlinkability
between withdrawing and redeeming transactions.
The third property appears contradictory because AMR
should be aware of this link to prevent clients from redeeming
a reward without having any deposit in AMR. In Section V-E,
we introduce a combining secret note technique allowing
clients with more than one deposit to obfuscate the with-
drawing transactions, which helps hide the link between the
withdrawing transaction and the reward redeeming transaction.
Availability. Similar to the availability definition proposed by
Meiklejohn and Mercer’s Mo¨bius system [35], AMR should
ensure that (i) no one can prevent clients from using the mixer,
and (ii) once the coins are deposited to the contract, no one
can prevent clients from withdrawing their coins.
Frontrunning Resilience. Some transactions (i.e. deposit
transactions) in AMR alter the state of the AMR contract,
while other transactions (i.e. withdrawing/redeeming transac-
tions) have to rely on the state of the contract to form the
cryptographic proofs. Thus, if there are multiple concurrent
deposit transactions issuing to the contract, some transactions
will get invalidated by those trasactions that modify the state
of the contract. For example, in AMR, to withdraw or redeem
a reward, a client Alice has to issue a withdrawal and a
redemption transactions that contains cryptographic proofs
proving that Alice deposited a coin in the past. Alice generates
those cryptographic proofs w.r.t all current deposit transactions
issued to the AMR contract. However, if another client Bob
tries to deposit coins into the AMR contract, and Bob’s
transaction gets mined before Alice withdrawing/redeeming
transactions, the proofs included in Alice transactions are no
longer valid (because the state used for her proofs is outdated).
This is a front-running problem [19], [23]. Therefore, to
ensure the usability of the system, the AMR contract should
be resilient against front-running by both clients and miners.
D. Threat Models
We assume that the cryptographic primitives (cf. Section II)
are secure. We further assume that adversaries are compu-
tationally bounded and can only corrupt at most 1/3 of the
consensus participants of the blockchain. Thus, we assume
that an adversary cannot tamper with the execution of the
AMR smart contract. We assume that clients can always read
the blockchain state and write to the blockchain. Note that
blockchain congestion might temporarily affect the availability
property of AMR, but does not impact the correctness and
privacy properties. We assume that the adversary has the
capabilities of a miner, i.e. can reorder transactions within
a blockchain block, inject its own transactions before and
after certain transactions. Also, we assume that the adversary
can always read all transactions issued to the AMR contract,
while the transactions are propagating on the P2P network,
and afterwards when they are written to the blockchain. For a
withdrawal and a redeem transaction, we assume that the client
pays transaction fees either through a non-adversarial relayer
(cf. Section VIII), or the client possesses a blockchain address
with funds that are not linkable to his deposit transaction.
IV. AMR SYSTEM
In the following, we discuss various components of the
AMR system and provide more details of how AMR operates.
A. AMR Contract Setup
During the setup phase, public parameters and data struc-
tures are generated for the AMR contract and clients. In
particular, all cryptographic parameters are generated for the
contract. The contract is also initialized with different nullifier
lists to prevent clients from stealing coins, double withdraw-
ing, etc. The deposit and reward amounts, amt and amtrwd,
are specified as a fixed deposit amount of coins, and a fixed
reward amount of coins. The condition for getting reward, tcon,
is also published during the setup phase.
We denote stateh to be the state of the contract at block h.
The state may contain all data structures that are initialized
during the setup phase, and this state is given implicitly to all
clients’ and contract algorithms. Finally, the AMR contract is
deployed during this phase.
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B. AMR Client Algorithms
In our system, clients have access to the following algo-
rithms to interact with the AMR smart contract. Also, all
transactions are implicitly signed by the client using the private
key of the Ethereum account that creates the transaction.
• (wit, txdep) ← CREATEDEPOSITTX(sk, amt) takes as
input the private key sk and the amount amt coins
specified in the setup phase, outputs a deposit transaction
txdep and the secret note wit which is used as witness
for creating future withdraw and reward transactions.
• txwdr ← CREATEWITHDRAWTX(sk′,wit) takes as in-
put a private key sk′ and the secret note wit, output a
withdrawing transaction txwdr.
• txrwd ← CREATEREDEEMTX(sk′′,wit) takes as input
a private key sk′′ and the secret note wit, output a
withdrawing transaction txwdr.
C. AMR Contract Algorithms
The AMR contract should accept the deposit of funds,
handle withdrawals, and reward redemptions. Moreover, we
assume that the current state of the blockchain, stateh, is given
to all algorithms implicitly. Summarizing, the AMR contract
should provide the following functionalities.
• 0/1 ← ACCEPTDEPOSIT(txdep) takes as input the de-
posit transaction txdep, outputs 1 to denote a successful
deposit. Otherwise, outputs 0.
• 0/1 ← ISSUEWITHDRAW(txwdr) takes as input the
withdraw transaction txwdr, outputs 1 to denote a suc-
cessful withdraw and deposits amt into txwdr.SENDER.
Otherwise, outputs 0.
• 0/1← ISSUEREWARD(txrwd) takes as input the reward
transaction txrwd and the condition condition specified
during the setup algorithm, outputs 1 if txrwd satisfies
the condition for reward and deposit amtrwd coin reward
to txrwd.sender. Otherwise, output 0.
Condition for reward in AMR. Intuitively, the longer the
deposits are circulating in the AMR contract, the harder it
is to connect those deposits with a withdrawal. In particular,
when a client issues a withdrawing/redeeming transaction, this
transaction can be potentially linked to one of the deposit
transactions that happened before the withdrawing/redeeming
transaction. The longer time the clients wait before withdraw-
ing/redeeming, the more deposit transactions are issued to the
AMR contract. Thus, as the number of deposit transaction
(i.e. the anonymity set) increases, the harder it is to link a
withdrawing/redeeming transaction with the original deposit
transaction. In AMR, we incentivise clients by providing
rewards to clients who can prove that the deposit funds are
not withdrawn before a certain time, measured in a number
of blocks. The provided reward can for instance represent a
governance token for a client to participate in the decentralized
governance of AMR parameters.
V. DETAILED ZKSNARK-BASED SYSTEM CONSTRUCTION
We now present a zk-SNARK-based construction of AMR.
rootdep
. . .
H2p(·, ·)
cm1dep
Hp(·)
k1dep||k1rwd,2||r1
cm2dep
Hp(·)
k2dep||k2rwd||r2
. . .
. . .
. . . H2p(·, ·)
. . . 0n
Fig. 2: Illustrative example of Tdep. The tree keeps track of
commitments from by clients’ deposit transactions. The root
of the tree, rootdep is used to verify the NIZK proofs from
withdrawing and redeeming-reward transactions.
A. Building Blocks
Hash Functions. Hp : {0, 1}∗ → F is the secure hash function
that maps binary string to a group element F, H2p : F×F→ F
be a secure hash function that maps two elements in F into
an element in F. We refer to a hash function as “secure” if it
is collision-resistant.
Deposit and Reward Commitments. A secure commitment
scheme (Pcom, Vcom) can be constructed using a secure hash
function, Hp : {0, 1}∗ → F, as follows: (1) Pcom(m, r) returns
c = Hp(m||r), (2) Vcom(c,m, r) verifies if c ?= Hp(m||r).
Before depositing into the AMR contract, a client forms a
commitment cm = (cmdep, cmrwd) as a part of a deposit
transaction. To generate cm, the client samples randomnesses,
kdep, krwd, r and computes the deposit commitment: cm =
Hp(kdep||krwd||r).
Merkle Tree over Deposit Commitments, Tdep. The AMR
contract maintains a Merkle tree, Tdep over all commitments
cmdep. As mentioned in Section II, a Merkle tree is an instance
of an authenticated data structures for set membership [14].
The Merkle tree in the AMR contract is a complete binary
tree and initialized with zero values at its leaves. As deposit
transactions arrive, the AMR contract keeps track of the num-
ber of deposit transactions and updates the trees through the
ACCEPTDEPOSIT algorithm. A Merkle tree can be constructed
using a collision resistant hash function, H2p.
Finally, we denote pathi the Merkle proof of cmi. We
denote the Merkle tree root at block h to be rooth. We let
root.blockheight to be the height of the blockchain block when
root gets updated. Figure 2 gives an illustrative example of
the Merkle tree maintained by the AMR contract. In AMR, to
withdraw coins, clients issue a cryptographic proof verifying
that they have deposited coins in the past and have not
withdrawn coins before the withdrawal. To obtain a reward,
the client must prove that a depsoit has been kept in the system
for a certain duration. As follows, there are two types of proofs
that a client needs to submit to the contract.
Withdrawal Proof. To withdraw coins from the AMR con-
tract, for a Merkle tree T with a root, a client needs issue a
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proof proving the following statement:
Rwdr : {(pk, snwdr, sn′rwd, root;
sk, kdep, krwd, r, k
′
dep, k
′
rwd, r
′, pathi, pathj)) :
pk = EXTRACTPK(sk) ∧ snwdr = Hp(kdep) ∧
sn′rwd = Hp(k
′
rwd) ∧ cm = Hp(kdep||krwd||r))∧
cm′ = Hp(k
′
dep||k′rwd||r))∧
T.VERIFY(i, cm, root, pathi)∧
T.VERIFY(j, cm′, root, pathj)}
Where snwdr, snrwd, root are public values and
sk, kdep, krwd, r, k
′
dep, k
′
rwd, r
′, pathi, pathj
are private values.
(1)
Intuitively, in withdrawal transactions, the client needs to
reveal two nullifier values snwdr, snrwd in which the pre-image
of those nullifiers are used in the computation of committed
values. We note that the two preimages are not necessarily
used in the same committed value. As it will become apparent
in the later section, this approach allows a client to combine
secret notes to eliminate the link between withdrawing and
redeeming transactions.
Reward Proof. Obtaining a reward is straightforward. The
client needs to prove to own a commitment that belongs to an
older the Merkle tree. In order to do that, the AMR contract
needs to maintain an old root of the Merkle tree that serves
as an anchor for the client to issue the proof. Similarly, we
let T to be the Merkle tree with a root which is an older root
maintained by the AMR contract. The client needs to issue a
proof proving the following statement:
Rrwd : {(pk, snrwd, root; sk, kdep, krwd, r, pathi)) :
pk = EXTRACTPK(sk) ∧
snrwd = Hp(krwd) ∧ cm = Hp(kdep||krwd||r)) ∧
T.VERIFY(i, cm, root, pathi)}
Where snrwd, root are public values and
sk, kdep, krwd, r, pathi, pathj are private values.
(2)
In a redeeming transaction, the client reveals one fresh nullifier
value snrwd that has not appeared before. This technique
prevents a client from getting a reward without having any
deposit in the AMR contract. In this work, because we
use a zk-SNARK as an instance of NIZK, the relations in
both Equation (1) and Equation (2) need to be expressed into
different arithmetic circuits Cwdr and Crwd. The depth of the
tree needs to be hardcoded in the description of both circuits
Cwdr and Crwd before passing it to the zk-SNARK setup
algorithm to obtain different keys for proving and verifying.
Therefore, the AMR contract allows up to 2d deposits where
d is the depth of the tree. Different tree depths offer different
trade-offs in terms of costs of each algorithm (cf. Section VII).
B. Contract Setup
Let F be the finite field used in AMR, during the AMR
contract setup phase, the setup algorithm samples secure hash
functions Hp : {0, 1}∗ → F, H2p : F × F → F from
CONTRACTSETUP(1λ)
1 : Sample Hp : {0, 1}∗ → F and H2p : F× F→ F
2 : Choose amt ∈ Z>0 to be the fixed deposit amount
3 : Choose amtrwd ∈ Z>0 to be the fixed reward amount
4 : Choose tcon ∈ Z>0 to be condition for getting reward
5 : Choose d ∈ Z>0, Let X = {x1, . . . , x2d}
6 : where xi = 0λ for all xi ∈ X
7 : Initialize an empty tree root = T.INIT(1λ, X),
8 : Set root = rootrwd
9 : Choose k ∈ Z>0, set RootListwdr,k[i] = root,
for 1 ≤ i ≤ k
10 : Set rootcurrrwd = root
next
rwd = root, index = 1
11 : Construct Cwdr for relation described in Equation (1).
12 : Construct Crwd for relation described in Equation (2).
13 : Let Π be the zk-SNARK instance.
- Run (ekdep, vkdep)← Π.SETUP(1λ, Cwdr)
- Run (ekrwd, vkrwd)← Π.SETUP(1λ, Crwd)
14 : Initialize:
DepositList = {},RewardList = {},
WithdrawNullifierList = {},RewardNullifierList = {}
15 : Deploy smart contract AMR with parameters :
pp = (F, Hp, H2p, amt, amtrwd, tcon,
T, index,RootListwdr,k, root
curr
rwd, root
next
rwd,
(ekdep, vkdep), (ekrwd, vkrwd)
DepositList,RewardList,WithdrawNullifierList,
RewardNullifierList)
Fig. 3: AMR Setup.
secure collision-resistant hash families. The AMR contract is
initialized with several parameters: amt for the fixed amount
of coins to be mixed, amtrwd indicating the fixed amount of
coins to be mixed, and tcon specifying the minimum number
of blocks that clients need to wait for redeeming a reward.
Setting up Merkle Trees. Let T be the Merkle tree of depth
d, the setup algorithm described in section IV-A initializes
both T with zero leaves and initializes index to keep track
of latest deposits. Also, the algorithm initializes two lists:
RootListwdr,k to be the list of k most recent roots of T
Finally, the contract should keep track of a rootcurrrwd which
is the current reward root that one needs to use to form proofs
to obtain a reward, and the next reward root rootnextrwd. Recall
that tcon to be the minimum number of blocks that clients
need to wait before redeeming a reward, we require:
rootnextrwd.blockheight− rootcurrrwd.blockheight ≥ tcon (3)
The essence of this approach is to capture time by making
client prove that the commitments are included in the tree the
tcon blocks ago. Figure 4 gives a high level overview of this
approach.
Setting up zk-SNARK parameters. Let Π be the zk-SNARK
instance used in AMR, the setup algorithm Section IV-A con-
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Fig. 4: Reward Redemptions. Transactions tx1rwd and tx
2
rwd
need to use the old root rootcurrrwd to prove that the original
deposit transaction happened before when rootcurrrwd is formed.
structs circuit Cwdr capturing the relation described in Equa-
tion (1) and circuit Crwd capturing the relation described
in Equation (2). Then, the setup algorithm runs Π.SETUP on
both circuits to obtain (ekdep, vkdep) and (ekrwd, vkrwd)
Setting up commitment and nullifier lists. The AMR con-
tract is initialzied with four empty lists:
• DepositList is a set that contains all cmdep included in
deposit transactions issuing to the contract.
• RewardList is a set that contains all cmrwd included in
deposit transactions issuing to the contract.
• WithdrawNullifierList is a set that contains all unique
identifiers (i.e. snwdr, snrwd) appeared in withdrawal
transactions.
• RewardNullifierList is a set that contains all unique iden-
tifiers (i.e. snrwd) appeared in redeeming transactions.
Finally, as mentioned in Section III-D, clients can always
obtain these data structures by reading stateh of the blockchain
contract. Figure 3 formally describes the setup algorithm.
C. Client Algorithms
These following algorithms specify how clients interact with
the AMR smart contract.
Deposit. CREATEDEPOSITTX allows a client to deposit coins
into the contract and outputs secret notes, wit, that can be used
to withdraw coins or obtain a reward. Figure 5 gives a detailed
description of the CREATEDEPOSITTX algorithm.
CREATEDEPOSITTX(sk, amt) :
1 : Sample kdep, krwd, r
$←− {0, 1}λ
2 : Compute cm = Hp(kdep||krwd||rrwd)
3 : return txdep = (amt, cm) and wit = (kdep, krwd, r)
Fig. 5: Client’s CREATEDEPOSITTX algorithm. txdep is
signed by sk.
Redeem Reward. CREATEREDEEMTX allows clients with
the secret note, wit, and the secret key sk′ to issue a proof,
pirwd, to prove to the AMR contract that that client has
not withdrawn their deposited coins after certain number of
block counts. In order to form such NIZK proof, the client
CREATEREDEEMTX(sk′,wit) :
1 : Parse wit = (kdep, krwd, r)
2 : Obtain pph of the contract
3 : Compute snrwd = Hp(krwd)
4 : Compute cm = Hp(kdep||krwd||r)
5 : Get index i of cm from RewardListh
6 : Compute pathhi such that:
− Trwd.VERIFY(i, cm, rootcurrrwd, pathhi ) = 1
7 : Form witrwd = (sk′, kdep, krwd, r, pathhi )
8 : pinizk ← Π.PROVE(ekrwd, st[pk′, snrwd, rootcurrrwd],witrwd)
9 : return txrwd = (snrwd, root
curr
rwd, pinizk)
Fig. 6: Client’s CREATEREDEEMTX algorithm in AMR.
CREATEWITHDRAWTX(sk′,wit) :
1 : Parse wit = (kdep, krwd, r)
2 : Obtain pph of the contract
3 : Compute snrwd = Hp(krwd), snwdr = Hp(kdep)
4 : Compute cm = Hp(kdep||krwd||r)
5 : Get index i of cm from DepositListh
6 : Choose root ∈ RootListwdr,k
7 : Compute pathhdep,i such that
- T.VERIFY(i, cm, root, pathhdep,i) = 1
8 : Form: witdep = (sk′, kdep, krwd, r, pathhdep,i)
9 : piwdr ← Π.PROVE(ekdep, st[pk′, snwdr, snrwd, root],witdep)
10 : return txwdr = (snwdr, snrwd, root, piwdr)
Fig. 7: Client’s CREATEWITHDRAWTX Algorithm in AMR.
In CREATEWITHDRAWTX description, witdep is actually
(sk′, kdep, krwd, r, kdep, krwd, r, pathhdep,i, path
h
dep,i) because
there is only a single private note, but we keep it that way
for ease of readability.
obtains the current state of the contract to compute private
inputs (i.e. Merkle path) for the zk-SNARK proof generation.
Also, the proof generation requires the client to use an older
root maintained by the contract as part of the computation.
This approach allows a client to prove to the contract that
the client’s transaction was deposited before the root was
computed. Along with the NIZK proof, a client will include
the nullifier value as part of the transaction to prevent double-
withdrawing from the AMR contract. Figure 6 formally defines
CREATEREDEEMTX algorithm in AMR.
Withdraw. CREATEWITHDRAWTX allows a client with the
secret notes, wit, and secret key sk′ to issue proofs, piwdr,
to withdraw amt to the public key pk′. In this step, AMR
requires the client to issue a proof to verify that the client has
deposited coins in the past along with two nullifier values sndep
and snrwd to prove that those coins have not been withdrawn
before. The main idea of having clients issue nullifier values
is to prevent clients from withdrawing coins without having
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ACCEPTDEPOSIT(txdep)
1 : Parse txdep = (amt′, cm)
2 : Require amt=amt′ and index < 2d
3 : Append cm = to DepositList
4 : Increment index = index + 1
5 : Compute
- rootnew = Tdep.UPDATE(index, cm,DepositList)
6 : Append rootdep to RootListwdr,k
7 : If Block.Height− rootnextrwd.blockheight ≥ tcon :
- Set rootcurrrwd = root
next
rwd
- Set rootnextrwd = rootnew
8 : return 1
Fig. 8: AMR’s ACCEPTDEPOSIT algorithm. Block.Height
denotes the block height of the block containing txdep.
any coins deposited to the AMR contract. Figure 7 formally
defines CREATEWITHDRAWTX algorithm in AMR.
D. Contract Algorithms
In this part, we formally define the contract algorithms.
Accepting Deposit. Upon receiving a deposit transaction
from an externally owned account, the contract verifies the
amount amt, updates the tree structure, recomputes the Merkle
roots for both trees, and updates both DepositList list and
RewardList list. Moreover, depending on the number of blocks
elapsed since the reward roots get updated, the contract has to
update both the rootcurrrwd and the root
next
rwd accordingly.
Issuing Reward. Upon receiving reward transactions, the
contract verifies that the NIZK proof, pinizk, is valid with the
rootcurrrwd, and the nullifier snrwd is not in RewardNullifierList.
Once the verification passes, the contract updates the
RewardNullifierList. Here, we note that rootcurrrwd is the old state
of the reward tree; therefore, being able to prove that the snrwd
is used to compute the leaf of the reward tree with rootcurrrwd,
one can prove that their deposit has not been withdrawn.
ISSUEREWARD(txrwd) :
1 : Parse txrwd = (snrwd, root′, pirwd)
2 : Require:
- rootcurrrwd = root
′
- snrwd /∈ RewardNullifierList
- Π.VERIFY(vkrwd, pirwd,
st[msg.sender, snrwd, root
curr
rwd]) = 1
3 : Append snrwd to RewardNullifierList
4 : Do msg.sender.transfer(amtrwd)
5 : return 1
Fig. 9: AMR’s ISSUEREWARD algorithm. msg.sender denotes
the public key of the sender of txrwd.
Issuing Withdraw. Upon receiving withdrawal transactions,
the contract uses parameters provided by the transaction to
ISSUEWITHDRAW(txwdr) :
1 : Parse txwdr = (snwdr, snrwd, root, piwdr)
2 : Require
- root ∈ RootListwdr,k
- snwdr, snrwd /∈WithdrawNullifierList
- Π.VERIFY(vkdep, piwdr,
st[msg.sender, snwdr, snrwd, rootdep]) = 1
3 : Append snwdr, snrwd to WithdrawNullifierList
4 : If snrwd /∈ RewardNullifierList :
- Append snrwd to RewardNullifierList
5 : Do msg.sender.transfer(amt)
6 : return 1
Fig. 10: AMR’s ISSUEWITHDRAW algorithms. msg.sender
denotes the public key of the sender of txwdr.
verify both proofs, (pidep, pirwd), and checks that the nullifier
snwdr and snrwd are not in the WithdrawNullifierList to
prevent clients from withdrawing more than once. Once the
verification passes, the contract appends WithdrawNullifierList
with snwdr, snrwd and updates RewardNullifierList if snrwd
is not in the list. We note that snrwd is not checked in
RewardNullifierList, because a client may have issued a reward
transaction snrwd previously.
Figure 9 and Figure 10 describe the ISSUEWITHDRAW and
ISSUEREWARD algorithms for the AMR contract.
E. Combining Secret Notes
Linkage between withdrawing and redeeming transactions.
We recall that when a client issues a depositing transac-
tion, the client obtains a secret note with two elements:
wit = (kdep, krwd, r). We denote the block height when
the depositing transaction goes through to be h0. When the
client wants to obtain a reward, it waits for t blocks before
issuing a redeeming transaction that contains the NIZK proof
and the nullifier value snrwd = Hp(witrwd). We denote the
block height when this transaction goes through to be h1,
and h1 − h0 ≥ t. To withdraw, the client issues a transaction
with a NIZK proof and two nullifier values (snwdr, snrwd) =
(Hp(witdep), Hp(witrwd)). We denote the block height when
this transaction goes through to be h2. Here, we notice that
snrwd can be the same value for the redeeming and the
withdrawing transaction. Because of this link, an adversary
can infer that the original deposit transactions must belong to
the block with height ≤ h1 − tcon. This is not ideal because
the reward transaction would hence reduce the size of the
anonymity set for the withdrawing transaction (cf. Figure 11).
Combining Secret Notes. However, in the AMR system,
clients can combine secret notes as follows. Consider the
case when a client issues two deposit transactions, tx1dep and
tx2dep, to obtain two secret notes: wit
1 = (k1dep, k
1
rwd, r
1) and
wit2 = (k2dep, k
2
rwd, r
2). However, this time, a client can re-
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txwdr
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Fig. 11: Link between withdraw and reward in the standard
approach enables an adversary to reduce the anonymity set.
deem a reward by revealing sn1rwd = Hp(k
1
rwd), and later with-
draw by revealing (sn1wdr, sn
2
rwd) = (Hp(k
1
dep), Hp(k
2
rwd)).
Thus, the linking problem described before is no longer
possible. By issuing another deposit transaction and combining
secret notes of those deposit transactions, clients can always
remove the link between withdrawal and redemption transac-
tions. This approach does not affect the correctness of the sys-
tem while breaking the link between withdrawing/redeeming
and deposit transactions. Figure 12 gives an illustrative exam-
ple of how the combining secret notes approach eliminates the
link between redeeming and withdrawing transactions.
tx1dep
h0
tx2dep tx
′
dep
≥ tcon blocks
txrwd
sn1rwd
h1
txwdr
(sn1wdr, sn
2
rwd)
h2
tx′′dep
RevealPotential Link Potential Area
Fig. 12: Combining secret nodes mitigates the linking problem.
Disadvantages of combining notes approach. Combining
notes requires a client to issue more deposit transactions.
However, combining notes does not necessarily prevent a
client from redeeming a reward for newly deposit transactions,
as a client can always obtain a reward as long as the client can
prove to have funds in the AMR contract. There, we argue that
once the financial value of the reward amount is higher than
the cost of issuing a depositing transactions, combining secret
notes is healthy for the AMR, because it incentivises clients
to issue more deposit transactions. Figure 13 gives a formal
description of how the combining notes approach works in the
CREATEWITHDRAWTX algorithm.
VI. SYSTEM ANALYSIS
In this section, we informally discuss how AMR achieves
the security goals mentioned in Section III-C. As mentioned
in Section III-D, the underlying cryptographic primitives (i.e.
CREATEWITHDRAWTX(sk′,wit,wit′) :
1 : Parse wit = (kdep, krwd, r)
2 : Parse wit′ = (k′dep, k
′
rwd, r
′)
3 : Obtain pph of the contract
4 : Compute sn′rwd = Hp(k
′
rwd), snwdr = Hp(kdep)
5 : Compute cm = Hp(kdep||krwd||r)
6 : Compute cm′ = Hp(k′dep||k′rwd||r′)
7 : Get index i of cm from DepositListh
8 : Get index j of cm′ from DepositListh
9 : Choose root ∈ RootListwdr,k
10 : Compute pathhdep,i and path
h
dep,j such that
− T.VERIFY(i, cm, root, pathhdep,i) = 1
− T.VERIFY(j, cm′, root, pathhdep,j) = 1
11 : Form:
witdep = (sk
′, kdep, krwd, r, k′dep, k
′
rwd, r
′,
pathhdep,i, path
h
dep,j)
12 : Compute proof
piwdr ← Π.PROVE(ekdep, st[pk′, snwdr, sn′rwd, root],witdep)
13 : return txwdr = (snwdr, sn
′
rwd, root, piwdr)
Fig. 13: CREATEWITHDRAWTX Algorithm using combining
notes (i.e. wit and wit′) approach. wit’ denotes the different
secret note owned by the same client.
zk-SNARK, commitment scheme, hash functions) are assumed
to be secure, and AMR’s depositing and withdrawing func-
tionalities can be thought as the shielding and de-shielding
transactions in Zcash with a fixed denomination. Therefore,
the security of AMR follows from the security of zk-SNARK-
based applications like ZCash [44]. In particular, the malicious
outsider will not be able to learn any information from
the public data. However, an adversary can still guess the
link between a withdrawal and deposits, and this probability
depends on the number of deposits and withdrawals issued to
AMR. Thus, we need to understand this adversarial probability
to quantify the privacy offered by AMR.
A. Privacy Metric
We begin by defining a few parameters. Let h be the height
of the blockchain, we define:
• DepositSeth: The set of deposit transactions issued to the
AMR contract until block height h by honest users.
• RewardSeth The set of reward redeeming transactions
issued to the AMR until block height h by honest users.
• WithdrawSeth The set of withdrawing transactions issued
to the AMR until block height h by honest users.
DepositSet,RewardSet, and WithdrawSet are always avail-
able to the adversary. We also assume that |DepositSeth| −
|WithdrawSeth| > 0 for all h.
We say txdep originates txwdr, when kdep is used to
compute both cm in txdep and snwdr in txwdr. Similarly, we
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Fig. 14: Withdraw Linking Advantage w/o combining notes.
say txdep originates txrwd when krwd is used to compute
both cm in txdep and snrwd in txrwd. We define:
• txdep
link← txwdr : if the value kdep used to compute
cm = Hp(kdep||krwd||r) ∈ txdep is equal to the value
kdep used to compute snwdr = Hp(kdep) ∈ txwdr.
• txdep
link← txrwd : if the value krwd used to compute
cm = Hp(kdep||krwd||r) ∈ txdep is equal to the value
krwd used to compute snrwd = Hp(krwd) ∈ txrwd.
We define the adversarial advantages for linking reward
transactions and for linking withdrawal transactions as follow:
Definition 4: (Reward-Deposit linking advantage) Let A be
the PPT adversary, txh+1rwd be the only valid reward redeeming
transaction issued at block h+1 from an honest user. We define
the adversarial advantage as follow:
AdvrwdA,h = Pr[A(txh+1rwd )→ txdep s.t. txdep
link← txh+1rwd ]
where txdep ∈ DepositSeth.
Definition 5: (Withdraw-Deposit linking advantage) Let A
be the PPT adversary, txh+1wdr be the only valid withdrawing
transaction issued at block h + 1 from an honest user. We
define the adversarial advantage as follow:
AdvwdrA,h = Pr[A(txh+1wdr )→ txdep s.t. txdep
link← txh+1wdr ]
where txdep ∈ DepositSeth.
Similarly, the adversarial advantage in linking a redeem-
ing/withdrawing transaction is the probability that an adversary
can guess correctly the deposit transaction that originates
the redeeming/withdrawing transaction. The anonymity set
for each case is defined as 1/AdvA. We assume that the
deposit addresses are independent and unlinkable accounts for
our privacy metric to hold. If the same entity deposits from
different addresses, but a blockchain analysis allows to link
those addresses, the anonymity set would only grow by at
most 1 deposit.
B. Privacy Analysis
Systems without reward. In a vanilla AMR system that
only supports depositing and withdrawing functionalities, a
withdrawal transaction can be at the origin of any deposit
transactions of honest users before the withdrawal transaction,
under the assumption of the zk-SNARK security. In other
words, assuming the underlying cryptographic primitives are
tx1dep
≥ tcon blocks
txrwd
sn1rwd
h′
txwdr
(sn2wdr, sn
1
rwd)
h+ 1
tx2dep
RevealOriginal Deposit Area
tx1dep contains cm
1 = Hp(. . . ||k1rwd|| . . . )
tx2dep contains cm
2 = Hp(k
2
dep|| . . . || . . . )
sn1rwd = Hp(k
1
rwd), sn
2
wdr = Hp(k
2
dep)
Fig. 15: Combining secret nodes allows to mitigate the linking
problem between the withdrawal and the original deposit.
secure, the adversarial advantage of an adversary in linking
withdrawing transaction to origin deposit transaction is:
AdvwdrA,h = 1/|DepositSeth|
System with reward. Because AMR involves redeeming
transactions, we analyze its privacy by understanding the
adversarial advantages.
Reward-Deposit Linking Advantage. We recall that AMR is
parameterized with the value tcon, the number of blocks that a
client needs to wait to be eligible for a reward. We assume that
the adversary observes a redeeming transaction issued to the
AMR contract after block height h+1 from an honest user. A
valid redeeming transaction only indicates to the adversary that
the sender has deposited coins into the system at least h−tcon
blocks ago, where tcon is a reward condition parameter. The
probability that the adversary links the redeeming transaction
to the correct deposit transaction is hence:
AdvrwdA,h = 1/|DepositSeth−tcon |
Withdraw-Deposit Linking Advantage without combining
notes. Recall that a withdrawing transaction reveals two nulli-
fier values to prevent a client from redeeming a reward without
having coins deposited in the AMR. However, the reward
nullifier may appear onchain in a previous reward redeem-
ing transaction. This inherent link increases the adversarial
advantage in linking between a withdrawal and a deposit,
because the deposit transaction has to happen tcon blocks
before the reward transaction. Therefore, assuming that the
reward redeeming transaction is issued at block h′, then the
adversarial linking advantage in this case is:
AdvwdrA,h = 1/|DepositSeth
′−tcon |
Figure 14 provides an example of the adversarial advantage.
Withdraw-Deposit Linking Advantage with combining notes.
In Section V-E, we introduce a combining note approach.
Intuitively, the combining notes approach allows a user with
more than one deposit to obfuscate a withdrawing transaction,
to hide the link mentioned above. For example, by issuing
another deposit transaction (i.e. tx2dep) after the reward re-
deeming transaction (i.e. txrwd), the client forms the zk-
SNARK proof using the combination of secret notes of the
10
first deposit (i.e. tx1dep) and the second deposit (i.e. tx
2
dep)
to exit the AMR contract. Thus, by the definition, tx2dep is
now the depositing transaction originating txwdr. Therefore,
with the combining notes approach, the adversarial advantage
in linking withdrawal and deposit becomes:
AdvwdrA,h = 1/|DepositSeth|
which is as small as the adversarial probability with a system
without reward distribution. Figure 15 provides an illustrative
example of the combining secret note approach. There can be
different orders to combine secret notes, e.g. a client may also
withdraw without redeeming a reward on tx2dep, and exit the
AMR using the reward component of tx2dep (cf. Figure 12).
C. Other goals achieved by AMR
In addition to the privacy goal, we briefly explain how AMR
achieves the other goals defined in Section III-C.
Correctness. AMR satisfies correctness. If an adversary can
provide a withdrawal transaction that verifies without deposit-
ing any coins into the system, there are two possible scenarios:
First, the adversary can derive a new valid transaction for
the current state of the contract (i.e. observing commitment
list), or it intercepts a withdrawal transaction and replaces the
recipient address with its address. However, in the first case, it
implies that the adversary breaks the security of the underlying
hash function Hp(·), and the second case implies that the
adversary breaks the security of the zk-SNARK instance.
Availability and Data Availability. We argue that AMR
satisfies availability and data availability. Unlike existing cen-
tralized tumbler designs [28], the availability of the system
relies on the fact that the tumbler has to stay online. However,
AMR is a smart contract that executes autonomously on the
blockchain, so adversary cannot prevent clients from interact-
ing (i.e. reading and writing) with the blockchain.
Front-Running Resilience. Recall that the AMR contract
stores a list of k recent roots. To invalidate a withdrawal
transaction, an adversary needs to “front-running” at least k
deposit transactions before a withdrawal transaction. Thus,
one can choose the value k to be sufficiently large so that
the cost of attacking is too expensive for the adversary to
carry out. More specifically, to invalidate a single deposit
transaction, the amount of token an adversary needs to have
are at least k × (amt + feedep) where amt is the fixed
denomination specified in section V-B and feedep is the deposit
fee. For example, if we set k = 1000, amt = 10, assuming
feedep = 0.02, and let the token be ether, the adversary needs
at least k × (amt + feedep) = 10, 020 ethers (38m USD) to
carry out the attack, and the adversary will lose at least 20
ethers (76, 000 USD) in term of fee.
VII. EVALUATION
We discuss the implementation and evaluation of AMR.
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A. Parameters
Choice of cryptographic primitives. We use Groth’s zk-
SNARK [27] as our instance of zk-SNARK due to its ef-
ficiency in term of proofs’ size and verifier’s computations.
For the choice of cryptographic hash functions, we use a
Pedersen hash function [37] for Hp and evaluate AMR using
two different choices of hash functions for H2p: the MiMC [7]
and the Poseidon hash function [26]. Arithmetic circuits using
those hash functions yield lower number of constraints and op-
erations when compared to arithmetic circuits relying on other
hash functions [3], [7] (i.e. SHA-256, Keccak). Moreover, both
MiMC and Poseidon hash functions are not only designed
specifically for SNARK applications, but also highly efficient
for Ethereum smart contract applications in terms of gas costs.
Finally, as discussed in Section V-A, the commitment scheme
and the Merkle tree can be directly instantiated using Pedersen
and MiMC/Poseidon hash functions.
Software. Our implementation is built on top of the implemen-
tation of the tornado cash system [4], [5]. For the arithmetic
circuit construction, we use the Circom library [30] to con-
struct two circuits, Cwdr and Crwd, for two relations described
in Equations (1) and (2). We use Groth’s zk-SNARK proof
system implemented by the snarkjs library [31] to develop
the client’s algorithms (cf. Section IV-B), and to perform the
trusted setup for obtaining the proving and evaluation keys
for the AMR contract and clients. We deploy AMR to the
Ethereum Kovan testnet 3 4. AMR contract consists 1013 lines
of Solidity code.
Hardware. We conducted our experiment on a commodity
desktop machine, which is equipped with an Intel Core i5-
7400 @3.800GHz CPU, 32GB RAM.
B. Performance
We measure the performance and the cost of AMR using
the following tree depths h = 10, 15, 20, 25, 30.
3AMR’s address on Kovan: 0xdE992c4fBd0f39E5c0356e6365Bcfafa1e94970b
4A demo video AMR can be found at the following URL: https://youtu.
be/0tfifCLN8fE
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Tree Depth
# Constraints Setup Time Keys Size
Crwd Cwdr trwd twdr (ekrwd, vkrwd = 640B) (ekwdr, vkwdr = 672B)
Poseidon MiMC Poseidon MiMC Poseidon MiMC Poseidon MiMC Poseidon MiMC Poseidon MiMC
10 5, 370 16, 170 9, 860 31, 460 122.76s 318.58s 232.87s 623.36s 5.1MB 8.3MB 9.8MB 16.1MB
15 6, 585 22, 785 12, 290 44, 690 147.14s 486.51s 278.61s 946.42s 6.7MB 12.2MB 12.9MB 23.9MB
20 7, 800 29, 400 14, 720 57, 920 168.74s 583.92s 321.10s 1165.74s 8.2MB 15.1MB 16.0MB 29.7MB
25 9, 045 36, 015 17, 150 71, 150 217.10s 801.29s 416.13s 1560.74s 10.3MB 20.1MB 20.2MB 39.7MB
30 10, 230 42, 630 19, 580 84, 380 244.15s 897.33s 468.56s 1793.71s 11.9MB 22.9MB 23.4MB 45.4MB
TABLE I: zk-SNARK setup cost for withdrawal and reward relations.
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Fig. 17: Generation times for withdraw and redeem proofs.
zk-SNARK Setup. Table I presents an overall performance of
the zk-SNARK setup for both reward and withdraw circuits.
For the MiMC hash function, for a tree of depth d, the reward
circuit has 2, 940 + 1, 323 × h constraints, and the withdraw
circuit has 5, 000+2646×h constraints. For the Poseidon hash
function, the reward circuit has 2, 940 + 243× h constraints,
and the withdraw circuit has 5, 000 + 486× h constraints.
Onchain costs. Figure 16 provides the overall costs of deploy-
ment, deposit, reward, and withdraw for different tree depths.
The cost of deploying the contract is the most expensive
operation, accounting from ≈ 6m gas for h = 10 to ≈ 8m gas
for h = 30 for both the MiMC and Poseidon hash functions.
We note that the deployment cost is a one-time cost which
is amortized over the lifetime of a contract. Moreover, the
zk-SNARK verifying components of the AMR contract and
the hash functions can be deployed as independent contracts
and reused by future contracts which use same Merkle tree
structure. The cost of the depositing transaction depends on the
depth of the tree, which is approximately 43, 000+51, 000×h
for the MiMC hash and approximately 43, 000 + 41, 000× h
for the Poseidon hash function. The gas cost for verifying a
withdrawing transaction and the gas cost for redeeming trans-
action are approximately 370, 000 and 320, 000 respectively
for all tree depths and both choices of hash functions.
zk-SNARK Proof Generation. In general, the cost of gener-
ating a withdrawing proof is approximately twice the cost of
generating a reward proof, because the number of constraints
of withdraw circuit is twice the number of constraints of
reward circuit (cf. Table I). Moreover, As the Poseidon hash
function generates less constraints for the arithmetic circuit,
than the MiMC hash function (i.e. 243 vs 1323), we observe
a reduction of 3× for the clients’ proof generation time with
an AMR system using the Poseidon hash function. However,
the Poseidon hash function is a fairly new hash function
designed specifically for zk-SNARK applications; thus, it still
needs more attentions regarding security reviews from the
community. We decide to evaluate AMR on both the MiMC
and Poseidon hash to give an overall overview of how different
hash functions affect the cost of using AMR. Figure 17
presents the time for a client to generate the withdrawal and the
redemption proofs for different tree depths and hash functions.
C. Empirical analysis on Tornado Cash
To become eligible for a reward payment in AMR, clients
need to keep their deposit in the contract locked for certain
period of time (i.e. tcon blocks). Thus, one needs to decide
what the suitable value for tcon is (this value could be set by
voting with the governance token).
We perform an empirical analysis on the tornado cash
system [4] which is, to the best of our knowledge, the only
zk-SNARK-based mixer deployed to the Ethereum main net.
Tornado cash supports two operations: deposit and withdraw.
We analyzed their 10.0 ETH denomination deposit pool 5 from
block 9, 161, 895 (25 December 2019) to block 10, 726, 597
(25 August 2020) to understand how frequent clients deposit to
the tornado cash system. This frequency allows us to derive an
appropriate value for how long client should keep their funds
in AMR contract to be eligible for a reward. We measure the
average number of deposit transactions issued to the tornado
cash contract over the span from 5, 000 to 30, 000 blocks, in
increments of 5, 000.
Figure 18 suggests that for the waiting period of tcon =
30, 000 (approximately 4.5 days), we expect an additional 52
deposit transactions issued to the contract intermittently. The
more deposit transactions reach the contract, the higher the
anonymity set becomes.
Over the course of 8 months (Cf. Figure 19), we observe a
total of 2, 810 deposit transactions, and 2, 606 withdrawing
transactions on the tornado cash contract. We note that if
the number of withdrawing transactions equals to the number
of deposit transactions at any point in time, the size of the
anonymity set is reduced to zero. Thus, in contrast to Tornado
cash, the reward mechanism in AMR is used to incentivise
5Contract address: 0x910Cbd523D972eb0a6f4cAe4618aD62622b39DbF
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Fig. 19: Number of deposits and withdrawals issued to the
tornado cash 10 ETH pool.
clients to keep a deposit in the system to help maintain a
healthy gap between the number of deposits and withdrawals.
VIII. DISCUSSION AND APPLICATIONS
Trusted Setup in zk-SNARK. As discussed in Section II, a
zk-SNARK requires a trusted setup to generate the evaluation
and proving key for each circuit. While one can assume that
there exists a trusted third party which helps run the setup, this
trust assumption is typically not welcome by the blockchain
community, because if such third party can maliciously gen-
erate the keys (or the common reference string), it can form
a valid proof and steal the contract funds.
To remove the trusted third party assumption, one can
run a multi-party computation (MPC) setup where users can
contribute a share to the trusted setup. Several works [17],
[12], [18] proposed different protocols for such trusted setup,
and they showed that as long as one participant is honest,
the zk-SNARK instance will be secure. In particular, the
Zcash team has performed such MPC setup for their protocol
parameters in 2017 [39]. However, the MPC setup may need
to be carried out independently for different circuits and
related works [33], [20], [24], [21] have proposed several zk-
SNARK constructions that utilizes a universal setup that can
be used for any circuits with bounded size. These zk-SNARK
constructions can be easily integrated into AMR in the future.
Transferring arbitrary denomination. The current version
of AMR does not allow clients to transfer arbitrary amount of
coins privately among clients. To achieve such property, one
either needs an out-of-band communication channel between a
sender and a recipient to transfer secret notes, or the sender can
spend more fees to store additional encrypted data onchain.
Moreover, to prevent a sender from stealing coins from the
recipient, one could use a similar commitment scheme and
encryption as used in Zcash [6]; however, the use of these
primitives will increase the cost of the onchain verification.
Nevertheless, we will leave the transferring functionality of
AMR for the future work.
Sender outsources transaction fee payment. Issuing a trans-
action requires the payment of fees, and clients should not use
the same address for such payment, otherwise their addresses
can be linked. In practice users can chose to use a relayer,
who broadasts transactions and is paid from a fraction of the
withdraw or reward transaction. The relayer can receive the
corresponding client proof through a side channel.
Constant querying state. Most blockchain clients (e.g. Meta-
Mask) outsource their blockchain information to centralized
services such as Infura. Those centralized services are aware
of, the clients’ blockchain address(es), IP address as well of
the fact that the client queried the AMR contract state. These
services are therefore privacy critical, as they may be able
to link different addresses from the same client. We hence
recommend a privacy aware client to operate an indepen-
dent validating full blockchain client, or use network-level
anonymity solutions such as Tor or Virtual Private Network
(VPN) before connecting to these centralized services.
Decentralized governance. Once deployed, AMR’s system
parameters, will likely need to be adjusted during its lifetime.
One could chose an admin key to govern AMR, for the sake
of decentralization, however, we believe that a decentralized
approach would be beneficial. A governance token is hence
the natural choice, whereby AMR can itself distribute those
tokens to the clients participating in the protocol. We have
identified the following parameters that should be governed:
(i) new relayer addresses, (ii) condition for client reward,
(iii) the amount of the reward. Once a new version of AMR
is developed, the governance mechanism could vote to (iv)
migrate deposits to a new contract with new features/bug fixes.
IX. RELATED WORK ON ADD-ON PRIVACY SOLUTIONS
Add-on privacy solutions for smart contract-enabled
blockchain. While we are not aware of any academic works
that propose a zk-SNARK-based mixing system as ours,
the practitioners community presented an initial construction
BabyZoE [1], which also allows clients to hide the link be-
tween depositing and withdrawing transactions. BarryWhite-
Hat proceeded by providing an implementation Miximus [11],
and tornado cash [4] appears to be the first system deployed in
production which allows clients to deposit and withdraw fixed
amount of coins. Our work is to the best of our knowledge the
first academic work which presents such a system, formalizes
the privacy and security properties, and importantly, adds a
novel privacy preserving reward mechanism.
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Meiklejohn et al. [35] propose an Ethereum-based tumbler
called Mo¨bius. The construction of Mo¨bius relies on the link-
able ring signature primitive and stealth address mechanism
used in Monero [8] to hide the address of the sender and
the recipient. However, in Mo¨bius, the size of the anonymity
set is limited to the size of the ring, and the gas cost of the
withdrawing transaction increases linearly with the size of the
ring. Thus, in term of privacy, AMR offers a bigger anonymity
set over time while operating at constant system costs.
Bu¨nz et al. proposed a private payment protocol for
the Ethereum blockchain called Zether [19]. The core idea
of Zether is to use Elgamal to encrypt the balances of
clients.However, the cost of Zether transactions (i.e. 7.8m
gas) is expensive for Ethereum, and Zether does not hide
the receiver and recipient of a transaction. Diamond proposed
Anonymous Zether [22] to address the later drawback, but the
cost of Anonymous Zether is still expensive for blockchains
such as Ethereum. For the maximum anonymity set of size 64
reported in the paper, the gas cost of a single transferring call
in Anonymous Zether is 48.7m gas which is approximately
32 times the cost of an AMR deposit and 130 times the cost
of an AMR withdrawal for h = 30 (note that the block gas
limit in Ethereum is about 12m gas at the time of writing).
Rondelet and Zajac propose Zeth [41], which implements
all functionalities of Zerocash [44] as an Ethereum smart
contract. While Zeth allows expressive functionalities, such
as transferring arbitrary denomination of notes, it comes with
the cost of using a bigger zk-SNARK circuit than in AMR.
The choice of the SHA256 hash function in Zeth would result
in approximately 59, 281 constraints in the arithmetic circuit,
which is 50× bigger than the constraints from using the
MiMC hash (i.e. 1, 323 constraints) and 200× bigger than the
constraints from using the Poseidon hash (i.e. 243 constraints).
While the authors of Zeth did not report any numbers on the
proof generation time, we expect that the zk-SNARK proof
generation time in Zeth is an order of magnitude larger than
in AMR. The Zeth contract needs to store all encrypted notes
from transferring function calls, and depending on the size of
the transaction, this additional storage also incurs cost (storing
a 32-byte data costs 20, 000 gas [47]). The authors of Zeth
report that an estimated cost of verifying a zk-SNARK proof
is approximately 2m gas (5× the cost in AMR).
Other Tumbler Designs. The community proposes several
centralised tumbler designs [16], [46], [28], [45]. The main
essence of those designs relies on a centralised offchain server,
e.g., Tumblebit [28] and A2L [45]. Both require less trust in
the offchain server than solutions such as Mixcoin [16] and
Blindcoin [46] by preventing the server from stealing funds
from participants. The centralised tumbling protocols we are
aware of cannot ensure the availability property, because the
centralised system can censor deposits from clients.
Existing decentralized tumbler designs, such as Coinshuf-
fle [42], [43] and Coinjoin [34], address the availability prob-
lem by proposing protocols allowing participants to interact
and form transactions that helps hide the sender from the
recipient. However, the availability of participants and the
interactivity among them can be difficult to enforce and may
lead to privacy leaking side channels.
X. CONCLUSION
Coin mixers allow alleviating to some degree the missing
privacy properties of open and permissionless blockchains.
Their operations are cost-intensive both from a transaction fee
perspective and because “better” privacy is more expensive
than “weaker” privacy when measuring privacy quality quan-
titatively with the anonymity set size.
In this work, we introduce a zk-SNARK-based coin mixer
AMR. AMR is to our knowledge the first construction that al-
lows to reward mixer participants which hold coins within the
mixer for at least time t. This incentive mechanism should not
only attract privacy-seeking users, but also participants that are
interested in the underlying reward distribution. Therefore, we
hope that such a system fundamentally broadens the diversity
of the mixer user, improving the anonymity set quality for
all involved users. Our implementation and evaluation shows
that our mixer is practical by supporting anonymity set sizes
beyond thousands of users. We invite the interested reader to
try AMR under https://amrmixer.keybase.pub and to observe
our short demo at https://youtu.be/0tfifCLN8fE.
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